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The globalization of clinical research is the new reality. In 2009, fifty 
million people were enrolled in clinical trials worldwide.1 Over 31,500 of the 
approximately 71,400 clinical trials conducted in March 2009 were located 
beyond the borders of the United States.2  The largest pharmaceutical 
companies are expected to conduct up to 65% of their FDA-regulated human 
trials overseas by 2012, compared with only 44% in 2009.3 The percentage of 
clinical trials registered by the FDA conducted outside of the United States 
and Western Europe went from 5% in 1997 to 29% in 2007.4 Financing is the 
main driver behind outsourcing of clinical research. While it costs 
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1 Praia Shetty, Opinion, Review: Chasing Medical Miracles by Alex O'Meara; With 
All of Their Ethical Obstacles, Are Clinical Trials Really Worth It?, NEW SCIENTIST, 
July 11, 2009, at 48, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool. 
2 Philip W. Fiscus, Global: Risks for Drug Manufacturers, 56 RISK MGMT., May 
2009, at 50, available at http://www.rmmag.com/MGTemplate.cfm?Section=Mag 
Archive&NavMenuID=304&template=/Magazine/DisplayMagazines.cfm&Archive=
1&IssueID=335&AID=3894&Volume=56&ShowArticle=1. 
3 Id. at 50. 
4 Kevin B. O'Reilly, Outsourcing Clinical Trials: Is it Ethical to Take Drug Studies 
Abroad?, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 7, 2009, at 15, available at http://www.ama-assn 
.org/amednews/2009/09/07/prsa0907.htm. 
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approximately $20,000 to track a single subject in an American clinical study, 
it only costs about $2,000 per subject in India.5 
Despite the existence of internationally recognized protections for 
participants in clinical research, some study sponsors and investigators have 
failed to provide participants abroad with the rights afforded to research 
participants in the United States. The sheer number of studies conducted 
abroad has led to a lack of regulatory oversight, putting some of the world's 
most vulnerable populations at risk. This article will analyze two particularly 
egregious studies in which internationally accepted clinical research 
protections were not available to foreign participants in studies conducted by 
U.S.-based sponsors. One such study (the "Guatemala Study") took place in 
the 1940s, but was just recently unearthed from long-forgotten archives. The 
other study (the "Nigeria Study"), from the 1990s, has been the subject of 
battles in U.S. courts for the last ten years. While research ethics have 
evolved significantly since the time of the Guatemala Study, the Nigeria 
Study and its aftermath demonstrate that more than sixty years after the 
Guatemala Study, international human subjects remain vulnerable and 
currently do not have an adequate avenue for redress through the American 
regulatory and legal system. 
This article will discuss these studies, and how they failed to comply 
with current clinical research regulations. This article will then discuss the 
shortcomings of new and proposed modifications to clinical research 
protection, as well as a final rule promulgated by the FDA and application of 
the "Maryland Model" to federal law. Lastly, the authors argue that the Alien 
Tort Statute ("ATS") remains the best hope for protecting human subjects by 
providing a possible remedy for those harmed in clinical trials abroad. 
                                                        
5 Id. at 15. 
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I. THE U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED 
DISEASES INOCULATION STUDY, GUATEMALA, 1946–1948 (THE 
"GUATEMALA STUDY") 
In October 2010, Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, and Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, Katherine Sebelius, issued a joint statement 
apologizing for an unethical clinical study in Guatemala from 1946–1948,6 
which was funded by a grant from the National Institutes of Health, then a 
part of the U.S. Public Health Service ("PHS").7 In the Guatemala Study, 
researchers infected male prisoners, mental patients, and soldiers with 
syphilis, gonorrhea, and chancroid by introducing them to prostitutes that 
were either known to be infected or were purposefully infected by the 
researchers.8 In addition, researchers tried to create "inoculations made from 
syphilis bacteria poured into the men's penises and on forearms and faces that 
were slightly abraded . . . or in a few cases through spinal procedures," and 
had others drink "syphilitic tissue mixed with water."9 The researchers also 
attempted to infect the women by scraping their mouths, faces, or arms with 
infected needles.10 
The researchers sought to determine whether administering penicillin 
following sexual intercourse could prevent the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases.11 In total, 427 people were infected with syphilis, 234 were infected 
                                                        
6 Joint Statement by Secretaries Clinton and Sebelius on a 1946–1948 Study, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Oct. 1, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/ 
rm/2010/10/148464.htm. 
7 Discovery of 1940s Study Ethics Breach Leads to Apology From NIH, Investigation, 
MEDICAL RESEARCH LAW & POLICY REPORT, Oct. 6, 2010, available at http://news 
.bna.com/mrln/display/batch_print_display.adp. 
8  Rob Stein, U.S. Apologizes for Newly Revealed Syphilis Experiments Done in 
Guatemala, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/01/AR2010100104457.html?sid=ST201010010  
4522. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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with gonorrhea, and 128 were infected with chancroid.12 While a direct causal 
link between the experiment and casualties cannot be established, seventy-
one (71) subjects died while the Study was conducted.13  In addition, 
researchers drew blood from 438 children for further research.14 
A. LACK OF CONTEMPORARY HUMAN SUBJECTS REGULATION 
In their joint statement, Clinton and Sebelius stated that "The 
[Guatemala] [S]tudy is a sad reminder that adequate human subject 
safeguards did not exist a half-century ago."15 The Guatemala Study was 
conducted at a time when clinical research was largely unregulated.16 The 
Guatemala Study took place during the same time period as the Doctors Trial 
of the Nuremberg Tribunal, a response to medical experiments by Karl 
Brandt, the senior Nazi medical official during World War II, and more than 
twenty other Nazi physicians who were charged with conducting medical 
experiments that amounted to war crimes.17 The Doctors Trial was conducted 
under American rules of procedure, prosecuted by Americans and overseen 
by American judges.18 The Tribunal issued its opinion in August 1947, and 
                                                        
12 Historian Who Unveiled 1940s STD Studies on Guatemalan Prisoners Recounts 
Findings, MED. RES. L. & POL'Y REP., Nov. 3, 2010. 
13 Stein, supra note 8. 
14  Susan M. Reverby, "Normal Exposure" and Inoculation Syphilis: A PHS 
"Tuskegee" Doctor in Guatemala, 1946–1948, 13–14, J. POL'Y HIST. 6, 18 (2011). 
15 Joint Statement by Secretaries Clinton and Sebelius on a 1946–1948 Study. 
16 Information on Protection of Human Subjects in Research Funded or Regulated by 
U.S. Government, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SVS., available at http://www 
.hhs.gov/1946inoculationstudy/protection.html. 
17  Harvard Law School Library, Nuremberg Trials Project Digital Document 
Collection, Introduction to NMT Case 1, U.S.A. vs. Karl Brandt et al., available at 
http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/php/docs_swi.php?DI=1&text=medical. The crimes 
charged included medical experiments conducted on concentration camp inmates 
concerning the effects of and treatments for, among others, malaria, poison gas, 
sulfanilamide, bone, muscle, and nerve regeneration, bone transplantation, epidemic 
jaundice, and sterilization. The defendants were also charged with killing 
concentration camp inmates for anatomical research. 
18 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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the Nuremberg Code was finalized in 1949, one year after completion of the 
Guatemala Study.19 The Nuremberg Code, a set of research ethics principles 
for human experimentation, was the foundation for later-developed U.S. 
regulations governing conduct in clinical research, particularly with respect to 
the following concepts: voluntary informed consent, the avoidance of 
physical and mental harm, the importance of a risk versus benefit analysis, 
and the protection of the subject against injury, death, and disability.20 
The Guatemala Study, if conducted today, would have violated several 
federal regulations governing clinical research. There are currently two sets 
of regulations. One was issued by the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), and the other was issued by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). Despite minor variations between the two, the 
governing issues are the same.21 Because the Guatemala Study was funded by 
the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS), formerly a division of the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which is now HHS, the 
Guatemala Study will be referenced against 45 C.F.R § 46, the HHS 
regulation protecting human subjects.22 
B. LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD ("IRB") REVIEW 
The Guatemala Study was not reviewed by an Institutional Review 
Board ("IRB"), which would have minimized the ethical problems with the 
                                                        
19 Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials 
Under Control Council No. 107 (1949). 
20 The Nuremberg Code, Wartime Experiments on the Inmates of Nazi Concentration 
Camps, available at http://www.brown.edu/Courses/Bio_160/Projects2000/Ethics/ 
THENUREMBURGCODE.html; The Nuremberg Code, NATL. INST. OF HEALTH, 
available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html. 
21 For a comparison between the FDA and HHS regulations, see Comparison of FDA 
and HHS Human Subject Protection Regulations, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
available at http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinical 
Trials/EducationalMaterials/ucm112910.htm. 
22 Class Action Complaint for Manuel Guidel Garcia et al. v. Kathleen Sebelius et al., 
1, 7, 9 (D. D.C. 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-00557), available at http://articles.law360.s3 
.amazonaws.com/0232000/232069/Syphilis%20complaint.pdf. 
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Study. IRBs were not defined in U.S. law in 1946, and were required only 
after the Common Rule23 was adopted and 45 C.F.R. § 46 was finalized.24 
Federal regulations codified basic protections ensured by IRB review, 
including minimal risk,25  a positive ratio of risk to benefit,26  equitable 
selection of patients that take into account the challenges posed by 
conducting research on vulnerable populations,27  additional protection to 
those predisposed to coercion or undue influence,28 and informed consent 
process and documentation.29 
C. THE USE OF VULNERABLE POPULATIONS 
The Guatemala Study violated current ethical standards of clinical 
research by using vulnerable populations as subjects.30 Specifically, the Study 
involved multiple vulnerable populations currently protected by U.S. law, 
including prisoners, wards of the state, and the mentally ill.31 
Prisoners were originally given "vulnerable population" status in 1978, 
and are now protected under 45 C.F.R. § 46.301 et seq.32 The Guatemala 
                                                        
23 The Common Rule is also known as the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human 
Subjects, and is the baseline standard of medical ethics by which any government-
funded research in the U.S. is held. Various federal agencies have codified it in their 
respective sections of the C.F.R. See http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/common.html. 
24 Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects ('Common Rule'), U.S. DEPT. 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SVS., available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/ 
commonrule/index.html. 
25 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1) (2011). 
26 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2011). 
27 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (2011). 
28 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (2011). 
29 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(4) and (5) (2011). 
30 Supra note 12. 
31 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.301 et seq., 45 C.F.R. § 46.409, and the Belmont Report of the 
National Commission, described below. 
32 43 Fed. Reg. 53,652 (Nov. 16, 1978). 
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Study, conducted in the 1940s, did not protect prisoners in the manner that is 
required of research conducted today. The subjects' incarceration and lack of 
access to the outside world likely left them more inclined than a free person 
to receive the research inoculations or to sleep with prostitutes. The risks 
involved in the research, therefore, were not commensurate with risks that 
would be accepted by non-prisoner volunteers.33 Since IRBs did not exist at 
the time, there was also no IRB review of the treatment of prisoners.34 
Furthermore, the prisoner component of the Study did not constitute 
permitted research, as it did not focus on prisons as institutional structures35 
or on prisoners as incarcerated persons36 or as a class.37 
The next set of vulnerable subjects in the Guatemala Study were wards 
of the state, originally given federal protection in 1983 and now protected by 
45 C.F.R. § 46.409.38 This research, too, would now be impermissible, even 
though it only involved drawing blood.39 The research was not related to the 
status of the children as wards,40 it was not conducted in a setting in which 
the majority of children involved as subjects were not wards41 (i.e. it was 
conducted in an orphanage), and there was no advocate appointed for the 
children.42 
The last category of vulnerable persons in the Study was the mentally ill. 
While there is no particular section in federal regulations protecting mentally 
ill research subjects, in 1979, the Belmont Report of the National 
                                                        
33 45 C.F.R. § 46.305(a)(3) (2011). 
34 45 C.F.R. § 46.305(a) (2011). 
35 45 C.F.R. § 46.306(a)(2)(ii) (2011). 
36 Id. 
37 45 C.F.R. § 46.306(a)(2)(iii) (2011). 
38 48 Fed. Reg. 9,814 (Mar. 8, 1983). 
39 45 C.F.R. § 46.409 (2011). 
40 45 C.F.R. § 46.409(a)(1) (2011). 
41 45 C.F.R. § 46.409(a)(2) (2011). 
42 45 C.F.R. § 46.409(b) (2011). 
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Commission43 identified the need for special protections for persons with 
mental illness when they participate as research subjects. Specifically, it 
stated: 
Special provision may need to be made when 
comprehension is severely limited—for example, by 
conditions of immaturity or mental disability. Each class 
of subjects that one might consider as incompetent (e.g., 
infants and young children, mentally disabled patients 
the terminally ill and the comatose) should be considered 
on its own terms. [. . .] Respect for persons also requires 
seeking the permission of other parties in order to protect 
the subjects from harm. Such persons are thus respected 
both by acknowledging their own wishes and by the use 
of third parties to protect them from harm.44 
D. LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT 
Despite informed consent being "widely regarded as an ethical norm 
long before the 1940s,"45 the Guatemala Study researchers infected subjects 
with STDs without their knowledge or without obtaining informed consent.46 
Specifically, the researchers did not inform the adult subjects that the 
                                                        
43 See National Institutes of Health: The Belmont Report, available at http://ohsr 
.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html. "On July 12, 1974, the National Research Act 
(Pub. L. 93-348) was signed into law, thereby creating the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects for Biomedical and Behavioral Research. One of 
the charges to the Commission was to identify the basic ethical principles that should 
underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research involving human subjects 
and to develop guidelines which should be followed to assure that such research is 
conducted in accordance with those principles. . . . The Belmont Report attempts to 
summarize the basic ethical principles identified by the Commission in the course of 
its deliberations." 
44  Kenneth John Ryan, M.D. et al., The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and 
Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, THE NATL. COMM. FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJ. OF BIOMED. & BEHAV. RESEARCH, Apr. 18, 1979, 
available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html. 
45 Garcia v. Sebelius, 475 F.2d at 14. 
46 Discovery of 1940s Study Ethics Breach Leads to Apology From NIH, supra note 7. 
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inoculations were made with the syphilis bacteria.47 In some cases, instead of 
obtaining informed consent, researchers provided cigarettes to subjects in 
order to obtain compliance.48 In the Study, one PHS doctor corresponded to 
another, "I am a bit, in fact more than a bit, leery of the experiment with the 
insane people. They cannot give consent, do not know what is going on, and 
if some goody organization got wind of the work, they would raise a lot of 
smoke."49 The PHS officials were concerned "about the morality of doing this 
in the mental hospital and about consent."50 As previously noted, researchers 
also took blood samples from 483 children in the national orphanage without 
obtaining consent.51 
Rather than obtaining the informed consent of subjects, researchers 
sought cooperation from Guatemalan government officials and the 
institutions housing the subjects (i.e. mental institutions, prisons, or 
orphanages).52  Researchers provided medications, medical treatment and 
refrigeration in exchange for such cooperation.53 Also, researchers deceived 
Guatemalan officials during the experiments.54  For example, the mental 
asylum officials were led to believe that the inoculums were drugs and not 
active sexually transmitted diseases.55 In general, "correspondence between 
PHS officials demonstrates that they knew that they were hiding something 
and that these studies could not be done in the United States."56 
                                                        
47 Supra note 12. 
48 Garcia v. Sebelius, 475 F.2d at 6. 
49 Reverby, supra note 14, at 23. 
50 Supra note 12. 
51 Reverby, supra note 14, at 13–14. 
52 Garcia v. Sebelius, 475 F.2d at 4–5. 
53 Id. at 5, 22. 
54 Supra note 12. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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E. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO 
GUATEMALA, AND REGULATORY REPERCUSSIONS 
In November 2010, a month after Clinton and Sebelius's joint statement, 
President Obama charged the Presidential Commission for the Study of 
Bioethical Issues ("PCSBI") with further investigating the facts of the 
Guatemala Study and convening a panel that would conduct "a thorough 
review of human subjects protection to determine if Federal regulations and 
international standards adequately guard the health and well-being of 
participants in scientific studies supported by the Federal Government."57 The 
President asked PCSBI to begin its work in January 2011, and to report back 
to him with a completed report of its findings in September 2011.58  On 
March 1, 2011, the PCSBI named the fourteen members of the International 
Research Panel, most of whom were not from the United States.59 The PCSBI 
met in New York on May 18 and 19, 2011. PCSBI Executive Director 
Valerie Bonham briefed PCSBI on the status of the fact-finding investigation, 
and Guatemala's Vice President, Rafael Espada, M.D., briefed PCSBI on 
what Guatemala's independent investigation had revealed.60  Espada stated 
that "archivists in Guatemala used Guatemalan records to independently 
confirm [Reverby's research], to establish the depth of the events and to 
confirm the intentional infection of vulnerable populations such as inmates, 
                                                        
57 Barack Obama, Memorandum for Dr. Amy Gutmann: Review of Human Subjects 
Protection, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, Nov. 24, 2010, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/24/presidential-
memorandum-review-human-subjects-protection. 
58 Id. 
59  Bioethics Panel Names Group to Study Worldwide Standards for Research 
Subjects, MEDICAL RESEARCH LAW & POLICY REPORT, Mar. 16, 2011, available at 
http://news.bna.com/mrln/display/batch_print_display.adp. 
60  President's Bioethics Commission Meets to Continue Consideration of Human 
Subjects Protection at President's Request, THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE 
STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, available at http://bioethics.gov/cms/node/211. 
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soldiers, prostitutes and patients at a mental hospital."61 The archivists found 
no evidence of consent by the subjects.62 
On September 13, 2011, PCSBI released a report containing its findings, 
and PCSBI Chair Amy Gutmann stated that the Guatemala Study "involved 
unconscionable basic violations of ethics, even as judged against the 
researchers' own recognition of the requirements of the medical ethics of the 
day."63  PCSBI concluded that the researchers in the Guatemala Study 
intentionally exposed approximately 1,300 people to STDs, and did not 
obtain the consent of the subjects before engaging in research.64 PCSBI made 
particular note of the fact that many of the researchers involved in the 
Guatemala Study were also involved in an earlier study involving prisoners in 
Terre Haute, Indiana, and in that U.S.-based study, the researchers obtained 
consent from the subjects.65 Gutmann stated, "[w]e know the researchers . . . 
disregarded this fundamental ethical standard in Guatemala. The double 
standard is shocking."66 
It remains too early to tell what substantive regulatory changes, if any, 
will be made in the wake of the Guatemala findings. On March 2, 2011, the 
Commission requested public comment on current federal and international 
human subjects research standards.67  Included in the list of requested 
comments are those pertaining to "existing standards for protecting human 
subjects . . . internationally[,] . . . the ethical and social justice issues that 
                                                        
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63  PCSBI Press Release, President's Bioethics Commission Releases Result of its 
Historical Investigation of the 1940s U.S. Public Health Service STD Studies in 
Guatemala, Sept. 13, 2011, available at http://www.bioethics.gov/cms/node/308. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.; see also PCSBI, Ethically Impossible: STD Research in Guatemala from 1946 
to 1948, available at http://www.bioethics.gov/cms/sites/default/filesEthically-
Impossible_PCSBI.pdf. 
67 76 Fed. Reg. 11,482 (Mar. 2, 2011). 
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emerge from the current research system[,] . . . trial design[, and] duties to 
participants."68 
II. THE PFIZER TROVAN STUDY, NIGERIA, 1996 (THE "NIGERIA 
STUDY") 
In 1996, northern Nigeria faced an epidemic of bacterial meningitis.69 
Pfizer, seeking to gain FDA approval for the use of its new antibiotic 
Trovafloxacin Mesylate ("Trovan") on children, sponsored a joint American 
and Nigerian physician team to administer Trovan to residents of Kano, 
Nigeria in April 1996.70  The Study took place at the Infectious Disease 
Hospital ("IDH") and approximately two hundred children were recruited to 
serve as test subjects for the new drug.71 
At the conclusion of the experiment, eleven (11) children had died, 
while others suffered a range of symptoms relating to meningitis, including 
blindness, lameness, deafness, seizures and disorientation.72 One subject was 
unable to walk or talk.73 While courts and other sources have yet to find a 
definitive causal link between Trovan and the deaths, at least some of the 
children died mere hours or days after taking Trovan.74 A ten-year-old girl 
continued to receive Trovan for three days as her condition worsened, only to 
die while still on Trovan.75 Pfizer has insisted "that none of the patients died 
                                                        
68 76 Fed. Reg. 11,483 (Mar. 2, 2011). 
69 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009). 
70 Id. at 169. 
71 Id. 
72 Joe Stephens, Where Profits and Lives Hang in Balance, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 
2000, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2007/07/02/AR2007070201255.html. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Joe Stephens, Panel Faults Pfizer in '96 Clinical Trial in Nigeria, WASH. POST, 
May 7, 2006, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2006/05/06/AR2006050601338.html. 
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as a result of the application of Trovan . . . any deaths were the direct result of 
the meningitis illness and not the treatment provided during the clinical 
study."76 Nonetheless, an independent Nigerian report later found that Pfizer 
had seriously deviated from its protocol, compromising the care of the 
subjects.77 
A. FLAWS IN RESEARCH DESIGN AND EXECUTION 
As the Nigeria Study involved pharmaceutical research, this section will 
discuss the FDA regulations governing human subjects research. The two 
sections in the Federal Register pertaining to FDA's jurisdiction in human 
subjects are 21 C.F.R. § 56 (Institutional Review Boards) and 21 C.F.R. § 50 
(Protection of Human Subjects). Section 50.1 states that protection of human 
subjects applies to "all clinical investigations regulated by the Food and Drug 
Administration . . . including . . . drugs for human use . . . Compliance with 
these parts is intended to protect the rights and safety of subjects involved in 
investigations filed with the Food and Drug Administration."78 The FDA had 
jurisdiction over the Trovan clinical trial under section 21 C.F.R. § 50.1 as 
Trovan is a drug and the experiment was a clinical investigation filed with the 
Food and Drug Administration.79 
The Nigeria Study involved children as subjects, and therefore 
implicated 21 C.F.R. § 50 Subpart D. Specifically, the Trovan experiment 
was governed by 21 C.F.R. § 50.52, as it involved "greater than minimal risk 
but present[ed] the prospect of direct benefit to individual subjects."80 The 
applicable regulation states that such research may involve children as 
subjects only if the IRB finds and documents that: 
                                                        
76  Statement of Defense, Attorney General of Kano State v. Pfizer International 
Incorporated et al., High Court of Kano State, Suit No. K/233/2007, available at 
http://www.pfizer.com/files/news/trovan_litigation_statement_defense.pdf. 
77 Stephens, supra note 75. 
78 21 C.F.R § 50.1(a) (2011). 
79 Trovan Fact Sheet, PFIZER.COM, 1, available at http://www.pfizer.com/files/news/ 
trovan_fact_ sheet_final.pdf. 
80 21 C.F.R § 50.52. 
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(a) the risk is justified by the anticipated benefit to the 
subjects; (b) the relation of the anticipated benefit to the 
risk is at least as favorable to the subjects as that 
presented by available alternative approaches; and 
(c) adequate provisions are made for soliciting the assent 
of the children and permission of their parents or 
guardians.81 
These statutory requirements failed to provide adequate protection for 
the child subjects in several respects. First, an IRB or ethics committee never 
actually approved the trial. 82  Pfizer did not have the Study reviewed in 
advance by an ethics committee, which is required of a sponsor of a foreign 
clinical study seeking FDA approval.83 One Nigerian doctor stated that "there 
was no ethical committee at the time of the trial, none met, and no approval 
was properly given for the trial."84 In fact, the principal investigator confessed 
to forging a letter following the experiment's completion, stating that the trial 
had been pre-approved by the IDH's ethics committee, and then backdating 
the letter to a week before the experiment commenced.85 Pfizer allegedly paid 
him $20,000 to do this.86 Pfizer then reportedly used the letter to justify the 
Study when speaking with the media, and also gave the letter to the FDA.87 
                                                        
81 Id. 
82 Fazal Khan, The Human Factor: Globalizing Ethical Standards in Drug Trials 
Through Market Exclusion, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 899 (2008). 
83 Stephens, supra note 75. 
84  Sonia Shah, Globalizing Clinical Research, THE NATION, July 1, 2002, at 26, 
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020701/shah. 
85  Stephens, supra note 75. See also Amy F. Wollensack, Closing the Constant 
Garden: The Regulation and Responsibility of U.S. Pharmaceutical Companies 
Doing Research on Human Subjects in Developing Nations, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 747, 756 (2007). 
86 Joe Stephens, Pfizer Faces New Charges Over Nigerian Drug Test, WASH. POST, 
June 2, 2007, at D01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2007/06/01/AR2007060102197.html. 
87 Stephens, supra note 75. 
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Pfizer denies these allegations, insisting that the company believed that 
proper procedures had been followed at the time.88 
Furthermore, the Study arguably violated 21 C.F.R. § 50.52(a), as the 
high risk of the Study did not justify the anticipated benefit to the subjects. 
Little was known about Trovan before the Study, as available data was 
insufficient and clinically discouraging. For example, the Nigeria Study 
marked the first time Trovan was being tested in children in its oral form.89 
Trovan had also caused significant side effects in animal testing, including 
liver damage, a degenerative bone condition, and other damage to joints and 
cartilage.90 
Researchers allegedly exposed the subjects to additional unnecessary 
and preventable risks. A Pfizer employee hastily prepared the protocol, 
completing it in just six weeks, as compared to a more typical time frame in 
the United States of about one year.91 Researchers allegedly did not conduct 
preliminary tests to determine: 1) if the children in the Study actually had 
meningitis; and 2) if the strain of meningitis affecting northern Nigeria was 
responsive to Trovan.92 They also allegedly did not screen out children who 
had joint and liver problems and did not switch them to the control group, as 
                                                        
88 Id. 
89  Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009). However, Pfizer 
contends that dosing studies "had been conducted in both adults and children and 
showed that the drug behaved similarly in adults as it did in children before the Kano 
trial was conducted." Statement of Defense, Attorney General of Kano State v. Pfizer 
International Incorporated et al., High Court of Kano State, Suit No. K/233/2007, 
available at http://www.pfizer.com/files/news/trovan_litigation_statement_defense 
.pdf. 
90 Id. at 169. 
91 Stephens, supra note 72. 
92 21 C.F.R. § 50.52(b) (2001); Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 170. Pfizer contends that each 
patient was physically examined for symptoms of meningitis, and that a diagnostic 
lumbar puncture was performed. See Statement of Defense, Attorney General of Kano 
State v. Pfizer International Incorporated et al., High Court of Kano State, Suit No. 
K/233/2007, available at http://www.pfizer.com/files/news/trovan_litigation_ 
statement_defense.pdf. 
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promised, if they were not responding well to Trovan. 93  Administrators 
reportedly failed to conduct blood tests and spinal taps called for in the Study 
protocol to assess the safety and efficacy of Trovan.94 Following the two-
week experiment, Pfizer researchers and clinicians are alleged to have left the 
hospital without providing follow-up care.95 
The trial also allegedly violated 21 C.F.R. § 50.52(b) as the researchers 
allegedly did not present available alternative approaches to the subjects 
properly.96 Specifically, claims have been made that patients in the control 
group were given only one-third of the recommended dose of the antibiotic 
ceftriaxone.97 This would have rendered the otherwise FDA-approved safe 
and effective antibiotic therapeutically ineffective, reportedly in an effort to 
exaggerate the comparative effectiveness of Trovan.98 Pfizer, however, denies 
intentionally using a lower dosage of ceftriaxone.99 
B. LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT 
As described below, Pfizer investigators allegedly failed to obtain 
sufficient "assent of the children and permission of their parents or guardians" 
in accordance with 21 C.F.R. § 50.52(c).100  Section 50.20 discusses the 
                                                        
93 Id. at 170. 
94 Stephens, supra note 72. 
95 See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 169. However, Pfizer has stated that "four weeks after 
concluding the study—on May 15, 1996—a follow-up exam of study participants was 
conducted . . . [and] no unusual side-effects to meningitis were noted." Statement of 
Defense, Attorney General of Kano State v. Pfizer International Incorporated et al., 
High Court of Kano State, Suit No. K/233/2007, available at http://www.pfizer.com/  
files/news/trovan_litigation_statement_defense.pdf. 
96 Stephens, supra note 72. 
97 Id. 
98 Khan, supra note 82, at 900. 
99  Statement of Defense, Attorney General of Kano State v. Pfizer International 
Incorporated et al., High Court of Kano State, Suit No. K/233/2007, available at 
http://www.pfizer.com/files/news/trovan_litigation_statement_defense.pdf. 
100 21 C.F.R. § 50.52(c) (2011). See also Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 169. 
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necessary elements of informed consent.101  The regulation states that the 
investigator shall provide: "[a] statement that the study involves research . . . 
and identification of any procedures which are experimental,"102  "[a] 
description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the 
subject"103 and "[a] disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses 
of treatment, if any, that might be advantageous to the subject."104  The 
Nigeria Study allegedly did not comply with these regulations. The subjects 
and their guardians purportedly did not know that they were participating in a 
research experiment.105 Pfizer allegedly did not inform the children or their 
guardians of the risks involved or viable alternative treatments, such as a free, 
conventional, and effective treatment provided in the same hospital by 
Doctors Without Borders.106 
The regulations additionally provide, "information that is given to the 
subject or the representative shall be in a language understandable to the 
                                                        
101 For purposes of this article, the authors assume that the children are not of the age 
of consent, and are rather assenting to treatment, while the parent/guardian is 
consenting. The United States Court of Appeals stated, "Plaintiffs are minors and 
their guardians . . . [authors' emphasis]." See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 77 F. App'x 48 
(2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2003). The FDA regulations define children as "persons who have not 
attained the legal age for consent to treatments or procedures involved in clinical 
investigations, under the applicable law of the jurisdiction in which the clinical 
investigation will be conducted." See 21 C.F.R. § 50.3(o) (2011). 
102 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(1) (2011). 
103 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(2). 
104 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(4). 
105 Stephens, supra note 72. 
106 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2009). Pfizer has stated, 
however, that the treatment provided by Doctors Without Borders was "an injectable 
drug that was not approved for use in Nigeria and the United States and caused 
significant pain to patients." Pfizer also contends that Nigerian nurses at IDF 
informed the children's parents or guardians that they could choose between the 
treatment provided by Doctors Without Borders and Trovan. Statement of Defence, 
Attorney General of Kano State v. Pfizer International Incorporated et al., High Court 
of Kano State, Suit No. K/233/2007, available at http://www.pfizer.com/files/news/ 
trovan_litigation_statement_defense.pdf. 
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subject or the representative."107 This allegedly was not the case during the 
Nigeria Study. Pfizer employees asserted that the nurses explained the 
specifics of the Nigeria Study to the subject's parents in their native language 
of Hausa, but did not fully translate the consent form.108 It has been alleged 
that the guardians would merely look at the administrators' faces and ask 
them to make a decision, indicating that they did not understand.109 
Section 50.27 highlights regulations regarding documentation of 
informed consent. It states that "informed consent shall be documented by the 
use of a written consent form approved by the IRB and signed and dated by 
the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative at the time of 
consent. A copy shall be given to the person signing the form."110  The 
regulations also state that the consent form can either be written, or in a short 
form indicating that informed consent has been "presented orally to the 
subject or the subject's legally authorized representative . . . [with a] witness 
to the oral presentation. Also, the IRB shall approve a written summary of 
what is to be said to the subject or the representative."111 
Pfizer researchers allegedly failed to obtain proper written or oral 
consent in accordance with these regulations. While investigators constructed 
a consent form for the Study that was approved by a local committee, which 
was useless as most of the subjects and their guardians were illiterate.112 
Pfizer could not produce any signed consent forms.113 Although Pfizer alleged 
that "verbal consent was obtained" and nurses talked to the families,114 Pfizer 
                                                        
107 21 C.F.R. § 50.20. 
108 Stephens, supra note 72. 
109 Id. 
110 21 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (2011). 
111 21 C.F.R. § 50.27(b). 
112 Stephens, supra note 72. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 19 
 
A Remedy in Sight 
also admitted that no witnesses signed forms attesting that verbal consent was 
given.115 
C. ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD 
Perhaps most striking was Pfizer's alleged engagement in fraud prior to, 
during, and following the research.116 As of this writing, publicly available 
knowledge on the Guatemala case has not implicated those researchers in 
fraud. In Nigeria, however, Pfizer allegedly falsely represented to the FDA, in 
seeking FDA approval for testing, that Pfizer had obtained proper approval of 
the local government and the IDH's ethics committee.117 Furthermore, a report 
later found that Pfizer allegedly never obtained approval from the Nigerian 
government to administer Trovan to the children and infants.118 The director 
of the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control 
("NAFDAC"), the Nigerian analog of the U.S. FDA, reportedly stated that his 
agency was not aware of the trial.119 Pfizer insists, however, that it "relied on 
approval letters and exemptions issued by NAFDAC, the Federal Ministry of 
Finance, [and] the Federal Ministry of Health."120 
Pfizer is also alleged to have fraudulently identified its principal 
investigator. While Pfizer told Nigerian authorities that a Nigerian doctor was 
the principal investigator, an investigative committee reportedly later found 
that the doctor was only nominally the principal investigator, as American 
researchers directed the trial.121 In fact, the Nigerian principal investigator 
                                                        
115 Shah, supra note 84. 
116 "Fraud" and its derivatives are used within this article to mean "deceit, trickery, 
sharp practice, or breach of confidence, perpetrated for profit or to gain some unfair 
or dishonest advantage." See DICTIONARY.COM, available at http://dictionary 
.reference.com/browse/fraud. 
117 Wollensack, supra note 85. 
118 Stephens, supra note 75. 
119 Id. 
120 Statement of Defense, supra note 89. 
121 Stephens, supra note 75. 
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allegedly admitted that he was unaware of the experiment's results and did 
not see one publication of the results until after they were published.122 
While the FDA regulations governing clinical research have provisions 
governing informed consent and protection of child subjects, there are no 
provisions explicitly protecting against fraud. In fact, as will be discussed 
below, much of what the FDA and others can do in the regulatory space does 
not and cannot address fraud. Therefore, the best solutions for human subject 
protection in this regard would be to increase oversight of the clinical trials 
where feasible, but more significantly, to provide a remedy in court for 
research subjects who have been harmed. 
D. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE PFIZER CASE 
The Washington Post broke the story of the Study in 2000, influencing 
the initiation of litigation.123 Families of the research subjects sued Pfizer in 
Nigeria and the United States, alleging that Pfizer had conducted the 
experiment without obtaining informed consent.124  The victims' families 
began U.S.-based litigation against Pfizer in a New York federal court in 
2001, alleging Pfizer engaged in "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment."125 
Various U.S. courts issued decisions in September 2002,126 October 2003,127 
August 2005,128 November 2005,129 January 2009,130 and November 2009.131 
                                                        
122 Id. 
123 George J. Annas, Globalized Clinical Trials and Informed Consent, 360 N. ENG. J. 
MED. 2050, 2051 (2009), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/reprint/360/20/ 
2050.pdf. 
124 Id. at 2051. 
125 Stephens, supra note 75. 
126 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2002). 
127 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 77 F. App'x 48 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2003). 
128 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005). 
129 Adamu v. Pfizer, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 495 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2005). 
130 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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Most recently, in June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Pfizer's petition 
for a writ of certiorari.132 
In July 2009, Pfizer reached a settlement with the Kano State 
government totaling $75 million, in which the Kano State government 
dropped all criminal and civil charges against Pfizer.133  As part of the 
settlement, Pfizer denied all liability and wrongdoing associated with the 
Study.134 The settlement stipulated that Pfizer would 1) create a Healthcare/ 
Meningitis fund not to exceed $35 million to provide financial support to 
those who can verify that they participated in the Nigeria Study; 2) fund $30 
million worth of future healthcare initiatives over two years chosen by the 
Kano State to benefit Kano State residents; and 3) pay Kano State $10 million 
in legal fees.135 Two six-member boards will be set up by Pfizer and the Kano 
State to administer 1) the Healthcare/Meningitis Fund; and 2) the $30 million 
health initiatives package.136 The settlement also stipulated that Pfizer would 
rebuild Kano's Infectious Disease Hospital ("IDH")137 and Pfizer began doing 
so in November 2010.138 Suits filed in Nigeria by the Nigerian government, 
and in New York by additional plaintiffs,139 were settled in February 2011.140 
The specifics of this settlement were not disclosed.141 
                                                                                                                              
131 Pfizer Inc. v. Abdullahi, 78 U.S.L.W. 3251 (Nov. 2, 2009). 
132 Pfizer Inc. v. Abdullahi, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (June 29, 2010). 
133 Pfizer, Kano State Reach Settlement of Trovan Cases, BUSINESS WIRE, July 20, 
2009, available at http://mediaroom.pfizer.com/portal/site/pfizer/?ndmViewId=news_ 
view& newsId=20090730005769&newsLang=en. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Editorial, Nigeria: Pfizer and Kano's Trovan Victims, DAILY CHAMPION (LAGOS), 
Feb. 12, 2010, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201002120101.html. 
138  Kevin Grogan, Pfizer Builds New Nigeria Centre as Part of Trovan Deal, 
PHARMATIMES ONLINE, Nov. 25, 2010, available at http://www.pharmatimes.com/ 
article/10-11-25/Pfizer_builds_new_Nigeria_centre_as_part_of_Trovan_deal.aspx. 
139 Joe Stephens, Pfizer to Pay $75 Million to Settle Trovan-Testing Suit, WASH. POST, 
July 31, 2009, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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However, some have questioned whether the settlement was fair to the 
families of the children who participated in the clinical research. While 
settling for $75 million, the Nigerian and Kano State governments originally 
sought $9 billion.142 A Connecticut attorney representing fifty-eight of the 
alleged victims recently commented that while in the final settlement Pfizer 
pays $10 million each to the Nigerian government, the Kano State, and the 
Kano State's attorneys, it only pays $35 million total to the 200 victims, 
meaning that each plaintiff gets only $175,000.143 Furthermore, the settlement 
does not provide an in-court remedy for those injured in human subjects 
research abroad. A cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, discussed 
later in this article, could provide that remedy. 
III. TRANSPARENCY-FOCUSED REFORMS INSUFFICIENT TO PROTECT 
HUMAN SUBJECTS 
Since the Nigeria Study, there have been several new and proposed 
modifications to clinical research protections, all of which have 
shortcomings. While providing some protections to subjects, these regimes 
will have little to no ability to prevent fraud and deficiencies in the informed 
consent process. 
A. INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL TRIALS REGISTRY PLATFORM 
("ICTRP") 
The International Clinical Trials Registry Platform ("ICTRP") does not 
provide adequate protection to subjects abroad. Launched by the United 
                                                                                                                              
dyn/content/article/2009/07/30/AR2009073001847.html?nav=emailpage. See also 
Bill Berkrot, Pfizer Settles Remaining Nigerian and U.S. Trovan Suits, REUTERS, 
Feb. 22, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/23/us-pfizer-
idUSTRE71M18U20110223. 
140 Berkrot, supra note 139. 
141 Id. 
142 Stephens, supra note 139. 
143 Dave Collins, Lawyer Challenging Reported Pfizer Settlement, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
FINANCIAL WIRE, May 26, 2009, available at www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool. 
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Nations through the World Health Organization ("WHO") in 2006,144 the 
ICTRP's main focus was to persuade companies and institutions to register 
their clinical trials.145  Through the ICTRP, the WHO standardized what 
information companies should publicly register before commencing a trial.146 
This information would ultimately constitute 20 key details, including 
information regarding funding and study design.147 By creating a standardized 
public registry, the hope of the WHO is to create a climate in which funding 
sources will make more informed and prudent decisions based on the ethics 
of the researchers.148 
While creating a standardized public registry may theoretically have 
helped the Nigeria Study subjects by increasing transparency, the ICTRP fails 
to provide an adequate remedy to international clinical trials victims, such as 
those in the Nigeria Study, because the platform focuses on funding, identity 
of sponsors, and basic study design, not on the proper treatment of human 
subjects.149 Most importantly, the ICTRP does not address informed consent 
requirements or protect against violations,150  and it is only a voluntary 
guideline.151 
                                                        
144  Molly McGregor, Uninformed Consent: The United Nations' Failure to 
Appropriately Police Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L 
L. REV. 103, 109 (2007). 
145 Id. at 109–10. 
146 Id. at 111. 
147 UN Health Agency Sets New Standards for Registration of All Human Medical 
Research, U.N. DAILY NEWS, May 19, 2006, available at http://www.un.org/ 
news/dh/pdf/english/2006/19052006.pdf [hereinafter UN Health Agency]. 
148 McGregor, supra note 144, at 112 & 124. 
149 Id. at 120. See also UN Health Agency, supra note 147. 
150 McGregor, supra note 144, at 116–17. 
151 Id. at 117. 
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B. REGISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL TRIALS 
Another proposal that would similarly fall short in protecting subjects is 
the establishment of a public registry of international clinical trials. 
According to one expert, a public registry "standardized and validated by a 
reliable source would be invaluable in improving data, trials and patient 
safety."152 The Government Accountability Project ("GAP") suggests that this 
registry build upon the existing federal clinical registry.153 Registration would 
require sponsors to disclose both positive and negative information, which 
would reduce the likelihood of sponsors withholding unfavorable trial 
information.154  One proponent of this idea cites ClinicalTrials.gov as a 
potential model.155 
Some have criticized the potential effectiveness of an international 
public registry. According to the GAP, the current public registry in place 
does not list all clinical trials being conducted worldwide.156 A drug company 
can still maintain unregistered trials, and fail to report unsatisfactory results 
with impunity.157 Giving the FDA subpoena power would assist the FDA in 
bringing unfavorable data to light.158  In addition, new legislation sup-
plementing the FDA Amendment Act's provisions on clinical trial registration 
may increase the incidence of public disclosure.159 
                                                        
152 Barry Malkin, Expert: International Trials Face Ethical, Monitoring Challenges, 
CLINICAL TRIALS ADVISOR, Jan. 22, 2009, available at www.lexisnexis.com/ 
lawschool. 
153 GAP Calls on Congress, FDA to Impose More Clinical Trial Oversight, FDA 
WEEK, Apr. 17, 2009, available at www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool [hereinafter GAP 
Calls on Congress]. 
154 Malkin, supra note 152. 
155 Id. 
156 GAP Calls on Congress, supra note 153. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Malkin, supra note 152. 
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The ICTRP, discussed above, may serve as a model or foundation for 
such a public registry. However, the ICTRP's focus on the need to increase 
public availability of clinical research data is insufficient to solve the 
problems discussed earlier in this article. The ITCRP's proponents seem to 
believe, perhaps mistakenly, that the public will serve as adequate watchdogs 
and be able to quickly respond to ethical violations in the midst of epidemics, 
given the pressing need for drugs.160 Lastly, because the major flaws of the 
Trovan experiment included alleged fraud and deficiencies in informed 
consent, and that hundreds of registries existed at that time, it is unlikely that 
the ICTRP or a similar registry could have guarded against Pfizer's 
misconduct.161 
IV. NEW AND PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE REGULATORY REGIME 
The FDA recently passed new regulations that offer promise for greater 
protection of human subjects abroad. These regulations include a good 
clinical practice ("GCP") standard, independent ethics committee ("IEC") 
requirements, more informed consent regulations, as well as greater 
documentation and reporting of the study design. 
According to several senior FDA officials, the FDA hopes to issue more 
binding regulations, rather than persuasive guidance in the clinical trials 
space.162 This is evidenced by the FDA's April 2008 promulgation of a final 
rule regarding "foreign clinical studies not conducted under an investigational 
new drug application."163 The new regulations went into effect on October 27, 
2008.164 
                                                        
160 McGregor, supra note 144, at 103, 122 & 124–25. 
161 Id. at 120. 
162 FDA OFFICIAL SEES PUSH FOR CLINICAL TRIAL RULES RATHER THAN GUIDANCE, 
DRUG INDUSTRY DAILY, Apr. 29, 2008, available at www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool. 
163 73 Fed. Reg. 22,800 (Apr. 28, 2008). 
164  Douglas Peddicord, Clinical Trials Adhere to the Highest Standards, STRAITS 
TIMES (SINGAPORE), June 13, 2009, available at www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool. Also 
see 73 Fed. Reg. at 22,800. 
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A. GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE ("GCP") 
While the FDA previously had authority over foreign clinical studies by 
the ethical guidelines set forth in the Declaration of Helsinki, the 2008 rule 
now holds these trials to the standards of Good Clinical Practice ("GCP").165 
The final rule defines GCP "as a standard for the design, conduct, 
performance, monitoring, auditing, recording, analysis, and reporting of 
clinical trials in a way that provides assurance that the data and reported 
results are credible and accurate and that the rights, safety, and well-being of 
trial subjects are protected."166 The FDA further defines GCP as including 
pre-study review and approval by an IEC, ongoing review by the IEC during 
the study, and "obtaining and documenting" informed consent of the subject 
or her legally authorized representative prior to a study.167 Further elements 
of GCP include 1) providing supporting documentation; and 2) if necessary, 
submitting to an onsite inspection.168 
B. REVIEW BY INDEPENDENT ETHICS COMMITTEE ("IEC") 
The new FDA rule mandates that such trials be reviewed and approved 
by an Independent Ethics Committee ("IEC").169 The rule defines an IEC "as 
a review panel that is responsible for ensuring the protection of the rights, 
safety, and well-being of human subjects involved in a clinical investigation 
and is adequately constituted to provide assurance of that protection."170 The 
final rule also clarifies that an IRB is a form of IEC.171 
According to the final rule, the applicant or sponsor must submit 
information including the name and address of the IEC, a statement that the 
                                                        
165 73 Fed. Reg. at 22,800. 
166 Id. at 22,806. 
167 Id. at 22,801. 
168 Id. at 22,806. 
169 Id. at 22,800. 
170 Id. at 22,801. 
171 Id. at 22,805. 
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IEC qualifies under § 312.3, supporting documentation to verify the identities 
and qualifications of IEC members, and a summary of the IEC's approval, 
modification, or favorable opinion of the study.172 The applicant, or sponsor, 
is also required to maintain records supporting the statement of qualification 
as an IEC, in addition to the identities of the qualifications of IEC members, 
in the event of an agency review.173 
An IEC requirement provides inadequate protection for international 
human subjects. As discussed above, the Trovan trials were conducted 
without an IRB. Thus, the problem with the trial was not that there was not an 
IRB, but that reportedly, Pfizer fraudulently led the FDA to believe that there 
was one.174 The rule's provisions regarding IECs do not provide a safeguard 
against fraudulent conduct. 
This regulation lacks teeth given the shortage of FDA staff and small 
number of inspections worldwide. This regulation is also ambiguous. The 
IEC must review and approve a clinical study before implementation, but the 
rule does not specify the exact procedures required by the IEC.175 The FDA is 
aware of and defends this ambiguity: it states that it did not articulate such 
specifics "because different procedures offering equivalent human subject 
protection may be followed in different countries."176 The rule stated that the 
GCP standards in general, and the mandate of the IEC to review and approve 
specifically, "are and should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
differences in how countries regulate the conduct of clinical research, while 
ensuring adequate and comparable human subject protection."177  While 
different countries undoubtedly demonstrate acceptable differences in how 
they regulate clinical trials, the ambiguity of this standard may lead to abuse. 
For example, accepting a multi-layered informed consent approach involving 
                                                        
172 Id. at 22,801–02. 
173 Id. 
174 Wollensack, supra note 85, at 756. 
175 73 Fed. Reg. at 22,807. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
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different members of the community, while in one instance producing viable 
and culturally sensitive informed consent, would be prone to corruption in a 
different situation. The FDA should clarify what constitutes appropriate, 
informed consent to provide sponsors and researchers with clear boundaries. 
This might be accomplished by providing non-exhaustive lists of both 
acceptable and unacceptable ways in which informed consent practices can 
and cannot be changed to take into account cultural norms and 
understandings. These non-exhaustive lists would in turn give the FDA 
greater discretion as reasonably necessary. 
C. INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS 
The new final rule provides additional protections regarding informed 
consent. It mandates that the sponsor/applicant disclose to the FDA 
descriptions of how informed consent was obtained from the subjects.178 This 
may increase transparency and encourage sponsors to properly obtain 
informed consent. Increased disclosure may also help ensure that the sponsor 
adequately conveys information regarding alternative treatments and the fact 
that the subjects are involved in a clinical study and not proven therapy. 
The final rule also sets a high bar for when sponsors are exempt from 
obtaining informed consent. The rule does not require informed consent 
under certain limited, life-threatening situations.179 In such a situation, the 
IEC must conduct its review prior to the study's commencement.180 The IEC 
must also find that obtaining informed consent is not feasible.181 Finally, the 
IEC must find either that 1) the life-threatening situation is "consistent" with 
those articulated in 21 C.F.R. § 50.23 or 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a), or 2) "that the 
measures described in the study protocol or elsewhere will protect the rights, 
safety, and well-being of subjects."182 
                                                        
178 Id. at 22,801–22. 
179 Id. at 22,801. 
180 Id. at 22,806. 
181 Id. at 22,816. 
182 Id. at 22,816. 
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D. SUPPORTING INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 
Under the new rule, the sponsor or applicant must submit "the 
investigator's qualifications."183  This may serve as a safeguard against 
fraudulently representing the principal investigator, as occurred in the Nigeria 
Study. Perhaps more importantly, the new rule adds additional regulation to 
promote sound protocol and study set-up and execution, including a 
comprehensive protocol summary, study results, and case records and 
additional background data regarding study integrity upon request.184 
Furthermore, the sponsor must submit documentation of how it monitored the 
study, and how the sponsor maintained consistency with the protocol.185 The 
authority of the FDA to request "case records or additional background data" 
may also limit abuse, as it will allow the FDA to see individual case 
histories.186 
E. POTENTIAL ONSITE INSPECTION 
The FDA's onsite inspection power in this final rule is particularly 
encouraging. However, it is questionable how viable onsite inspections are, 
given their cost and the lack of political support they will likely receive. 
International monitoring is currently not a priority of the FDA, as it does not 
even inspect 3,500, or one percent, of its 350,000 registered trial sites.187 One 
commentator suggested that the FDA "be provided sufficient resources to 
conduct inspections on a global basis" to ensure greater human subjects 
protection abroad.188 However, it is unlikely that the government can realize 
this vision given funding concerns. Despite the Office of the Inspector 
General ("OIG") of the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") 
                                                        
183 Id. at 22,802. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 22,802. 
186 Id. 
187 Shetty, supra note 1. 
188 Clinical Research Safety and Ethical Standards in Developing World Up to U.S. 
Levels, Report Says, PR NEWSWIRE, July 21, 2009, available at http://www.lexisnexis 
.com/lawschool. 
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recommending in a recent report that the FDA "inspect clinical trials in more 
countries,"189 the OIG admits in that very same report, "[w]ith inspections 
costing about $40,000 each and the additional logistical challenges of 
conducting inspections at foreign sites, it may be more difficult for [the] FDA 
to justify a foreign inspection."190 
Perhaps a viable alternative may be to shift the cost burden of onsite 
inspections to the host countries. One proponent of this approach has argued 
for host countries to strengthen their own regulatory agencies' monitoring of 
investigators and research, and to share that information with the FDA "so it 
doesn't fall on the FDA to be the police for global clinical research."191 The 
OIG of HHS recently echoed this proposal, calling for the FDA to "continue 
to develop inspectional agreements with foreign regulatory bodies."192  In 
addition, Congress could grant authority to the FDA to require that 
pharmaceutical companies fund their onsite inspections in part or entirely, 
perhaps in an act similar to the existing domestic Prescription Drug User Fee 
Act ("PDUFA").193 However, opponents of private funding for inspections of 
foreign drug manufacturing plants point out that doing so "will make the 
agency beholden to manufacturers and more apt to overlook production 
flaws."194  A similar risk is possible in private funding of foreign study 
inspections, as the FDA may be less willing to be objectively critical during 
inspections given its source of funding. 
                                                        
189 Daniel R. Levinson, Challenges to FDA's Ability to Monitor and Inspect Foreign 
Clinical Trials, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AT THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES, June 2010, at 21, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/ 
oei-01-08-00510.pdf. 
190 Id. 
191 O'Reilly, supra note 4. 
192 Levinson, supra note 189. 
193  See Prescription Drug User Fee Act, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/default.htm. 
194 Drew Armstrong, For FDA, Congress Readies a Bitter Pill, CQ WEEKLY, Apr. 7, 
2008, at 868, available at http://public.cq.com/docs/cqw/weeklyreport110-0000026 
97959.html. 
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F. APPLYING THE MARYLAND MODEL TO FEDERAL LAW 
COULD FURTHER ENHANCE PROTECTION 
Congress could protect all human subjects of American pharmaceutical 
companies abroad by enacting federal legislation similar to the legislation 
passed in Maryland. Congress has yet to enact overarching regulation on all 
domestic human subjects research, which it has already done with animal 
research.195  Human research subjects abroad are similarly not universally 
protected by federal regulations. They are protected only if the research is at 
least partially funded by the 17 federal agencies "that have adopted the 
Common Rule."196 The FDA then provides additional protection for subjects 
involved in research obtained as part of an application for approval to market 
a drug, device, or biologic product.197 
The Maryland law, which became effective on October 1, 2002, 
mandates that all clinical research in Maryland comply with HHS and FDA 
regulations, regardless of whether or not the research receives federal 
funds.198 The GAP has recommended that Congress extend protection to all 
human subjects in the United States, possibly by using Maryland's law as a 
template.199  Congress could take GAP's suggestion one step further by 
subjecting all clinical trials abroad sponsored by American pharmaceutical 
companies to HHS and FDA regulations, regardless of whether the trials 
receive funds from these agencies. 
Congress could incorporate other aspects of the Maryland law to further 
protect human subjects abroad. Most importantly, the Maryland model 
enables enforcement by authorizing Maryland's Attorney General "to seek 
                                                        
195 GAP Calls on Congress, supra note 153. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Wallace Witkowski, Maryland IRB Law Has No Money for Enforcement, But 
'Important Step' In Accountability, Attorney Says, BIORESEARCH MONITORING ALERT, 
Aug. 1, 2002, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-93955971/ 
maryland-irb-law-has.html. 
199 GAP Calls on Congress, supra note 153. 
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injunctive or other relief" if research is non-compliant with federal 
regulations.200 If Congress chose to adopt the Maryland rule as suggested 
above, an analogous federal enforcement mechanism would similarly 
promote the efficacy of the regulations. 
While promising at first glance, there are significant obstacles to 
Congressional adoption of the Maryland model. There may be constitutional 
limitations on the scope of the model, as scholars have commented that 
scientific research is protected under the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.201 Furthermore, applying the Maryland law to the Nigeria Study 
would have been superfluous given that the Study, as established above, was 
already subject to FDA regulations.202 There would also likely be a lack of 
political will in overseeing international drug testing not being funded by 
FDA or HHS. The fact that these trials are not receiving FDA or HHS 
funding would beg the question as to who would oversee these trials, and 
what that agency's interest would be in doing so. Federal agencies would 
likely be disinclined to oversee clinical trials where they had no financial 
stake. One option is for the federal government to collect fines for 
noncompliance, but fines would have to be significant enough to justify the 
costs associated with oversight. 
V. NIGERIA STUDY LITIGATION OPENS DOOR FOR ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE REMEDY 
The most recent litigation in Abdullahi v. Pfizer opened the door for use 
of the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS")203 as a cause of action used by human 
                                                        
200 Adil E. Shamoo & Jack Schwartz, Universal and Uniform Protections of Human 
Subjects in Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 4 (2008). 
201 Steve Keane, The Case Against Blanket First Amendment Protection of Scientific 
Research: Articulating a More Limited Scope of Protection, 59 STAN. L. REV. 505, 
506 n.5 (2006). 
202  The Maryland Model would have been inapplicable to the Guatemala study, 
because at the time of the study there were no regulations with which to comply. 
203 The ATS is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and consists of one sentence: "The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 
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subjects against American pharmaceutical companies for conduct abroad. In 
January 2009, The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed 
and remanded an earlier 2005 Abdullahi v. Pfizer District Court opinion, 
holding "that the district court incorrectly determined that the prohibition in 
customary international law against nonconsensual human medical 
experimentation cannot be enforced through the ATS."204 
The Court of Appeals argued for a more nuanced understanding of the 
application of international standards to U.S. courts vis-à-vis the ATS. 
Applying Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 205  the Court of Appeals noted that a 
federal court can recognize a violation of international law and a cause of 
action under the ATS "only if a plaintiff identifies the violation of a norm of 
customary international law that, as defined by the sources of such law . . . is 
sufficiently specific, universal, and obligatory." 206  The Court of Appeals 
found the District Court's application of Sosa's "sufficiently specific, 
universal, and obligatory" test erroneous, as the District Court only looked at 
whether each international law referencing the norm is binding and has an 
express cause of action.207 The Court of Appeals argued that, under Sosa, 
"[c]ourts are obligated to examine how the specificity of the norm compares 
with 18th-century paradigms, whether the norm is accepted by the world 
community, and whether States universally abide by the norm out of a sense 
of mutual concern."208  Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that the 
District Court incorrectly determined that international law cannot be 
                                                                                                                              
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 303 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2003). Congress codified it into law as part of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, but it was "only invoked a handful of times for nearly two hundred years." Id. 
at 304. The 1980 case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala brought the ATS out of obscurity, when 
the Second Circuit held that the ATS allowed federal courts to adjudicate "rights 
already recognized by international law." Id. at 304, citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980). 
204 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2009). 
205 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720, 723, 725, 728–29 (2004). 
206 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d at 174. 
207 Id. at 176. 
208 Id. 
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enforced through the ATS to prohibit nonconsensual human subject research, 
and reversed and remanded the lower court's ruling.209 
The 2009 decision suggests that redress in American courts for human 
subjects abroad is possible under the ATS because human subjects 
protections are universally accepted in international law. Several other U.S. 
courts have also taken this position.210 
The 2009 Abdullahi v. Pfizer opinion stated that the Nuremberg trials 
established the prohibition of nonconsensual medical experimentation on 
human subjects as a "norm of customary international law" which is 
recognized by "states throughout the world . . . through international accords 
and domestic law-making."211 The Code states that "the voluntary consent of 
the human subject is absolutely essential" and that "the duty and 
responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each 
individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment." 212 
Furthermore, the court held that the Nuremburg trials' "authorizing 
documents" and judgments established legal principles that became the 
"bedrock norms of international law."213 
                                                        
209 Id. at 169. 
210 See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc. 782 A.2d 807, 835–36, 849–50 
(Md. 2001). The permissibility of using the Nuremberg Code in U.S. courts was also 
addressed in a dissent involving a case of U.S. government sponsored human 
experimentation. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 687, 710 (1987). 
211 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d at 177–79. 
212 The United National International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 
7, THE HUMAN RIGHTS WEB PAGE, available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html. 
213 The Declaration of Helsinki's, and the Nuremberg Code's long established history 
of influencing government regulation further suggested to the court that it carried 
substantive weight in laying the foundation of American human subjects regulation: 
"Congress mandated patient-subject consent in drug research in 1962 . . . in response, 
the FDA promulgated its first regulations requiring the informed consent of human 
subjects. Tellingly, the sources on which our government relied in outlawing non-
consensual human medical experimentation were the Nuremberg Code and the 
Declaration of Helsinki, which suggests the government conceived of these sources' 
articulation of the norm as a binding legal obligation." See id. at 179. 
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The Court also held that the Declaration of Helsinki, adopted by the 
World Medical Association in 1964 and most recently amended in 2008, 
constituted a norm of customary international law.214  The Declaration of 
Helsinki created twenty "principles of all medical research," including those 
involving informed consent and appropriate risk of human subjects 
research.215 The court found that the United States and at least eighty-three 
other countries have incorporated the Declaration of Helsinki into their laws 
regulating informed consent of human subjects,216 which the Court found "a 
powerful indication of the international acceptance of this norm as a binding 
legal obligation."217 
Article 7 of the United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights ("ICCPR") was also recognized by the Court as a customary 
norm of international law. Article 7 of the ICCPR states, "[N]o one shall be 
subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation."218  The court recognized that this provision "is legally 
binding on the more than 160 [s]tates-[p]arties that have ratified the 
convention without reservation to the provision,"219 and offers protection to 
human subjects against "state actors, private actors, or state and private actors 
behaving in concert."220  The court concluded, "[t]he international com-
munity's recognition in the ICCPR of its obligation to protect humans against 
nonconsensual medical experimentation, regardless of the source of the 
                                                        
214 Id. at 182. 
215 WMA Declaration of Helsinki—Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving 
Human Subjects, WORLD MEDICAL ASSOC., available at http://www.wma.net/en/ 
30publications/10policies/b3/. 
216 See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 179. 
217 Id. at 179. 
218 Supra note 212. 
219 See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 180. 
220 Id. at 180. 
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action, is powerful evidence of the prohibition's place in customary 
international law."221 
Nonetheless, while the Second Circuit Court of Appeals argued in the 
2009 Abdullahi v. Pfizer case that a corporate defendant may be tried under 
the ATS, the Second Circuit split on this issue in 2010 when a separate panel 
determined that the ATS can be used to seek redress against an individual but 
not a corporate defendant.222 Until this circuit split is resolved, it remains an 
open question whether or not an ATS claim can definitively be brought 
against a corporate defendant, but one that trial sponsors should be aware of. 
VI. NEW GUATEMALA STUDY CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT INCREASES 
PROMISE OF ATS REMEDY 
A class action complaint, filed on March 14, 2011 by the victims and 
surviving family members of the Guatemala Study, also seeks remedy under 
the ATS.223 This time, however, the ATS would provide human subjects with 
a cause of action against the American government, as the Guatemala Study 
was a federally funded trial conducted abroad.224 The complaint, filed in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, involved seven 
plaintiffs, with the number of potential class members estimated in the 
"thousands."225 The ATS served prominently in the complaint. One of the two 
questions of law and fact was "[w]hether Plaintiffs and [p]roposed [c]lass 
[m]embers were unlawfully subjected to non-consensual human medical 
experimentation in violation of 'the law of nations' provision of the Alien Tort 
Statute."226 The complaint later alleged that the Plaintiffs' cause of action 
                                                        
221 Id. 
222 Sue Reisinger, WikiLeaks Sparks Interest in Pfizer Court Battle—as 2nd Circuit 
Splits on Alien Tort Statute, CORPORATE COUNSEL, available at http://www.law.com/ 
jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202479602161. 
223 Garcia v. Sebeliua, Complaint, case no. 1: 11-cv-00527, filed on Mar. 14, 2011, in 
District Court for District of Colombia at 31. 
224 Id. at 12. 
225 Id. at 7, 9. 
226 Id. at 9. 
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arises from the ATS, the ICCPR, and the Nuremberg Code, among other 
"laws, agreements, conventions, resolutions and treaties."227  The plaintiffs 
rested both their first claim for relief, the "violation of prohibition against 
medical experimentation on non-consenting human subjects," as well as their 
second claim for relief, the "violation of prohibition against cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment," on the ATS.228 The first claim of relief incorporated 
the ICCPR and the World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki, 
while the second claim of relief cited the ICCPR as well.229 
VII. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS AND THE ATS 
As demonstrated by the recent developments mentioned above in the 
Nigeria and Guatemala cases, multiple plaintiffs are now seeking to use the 
ATS as a remedy for violations of internationally accepted protections/rights. 
In light of high profile cases like Nigeria and Guatemala, there may be a 
groundswell of support for a remedy through the ATS, which could lead 
Congress to take action. The United States Congress could guarantee a 
remedy for injured human subjects abroad if, through legislation, it clarifies 
the relationship between international law and the Alien Tort Statute. 230 
Specifically, the legislature could either 1) adopt specific international laws 
as binding, or 2) merely recognize currently non-binding international law as 
norms for the purpose of creating a cause of action under the Alien Tort 
Statute.231 
One solution is for Congress to adopt the ICCPR as binding law, and 
through the ICCPR create a right of action under the ATS.232 Alternatively, 
the legislature could simply recognize the ICCPR's guidelines as norms, 
                                                        
227 Id. at 23. 
228 Id. at 24, 26. 
229 Id. at 25, 27. 
230 Wollensack, supra note 85, at 770. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
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creating an action under the ATS. Similarly, the United States could give 
plaintiffs a right of action against U.S. pharmaceutical companies by 
acknowledging the current "voluntary ethical guidelines [of the Nuremberg 
Code] as norms."233  Binding American pharmaceutical companies to 
Nuremberg would be one way to hold them accountable for their protocols.234 
The Nuremberg Code is an alternative that appears to be the favorite 
vehicle for establishing a remedy under the ATS. Several U.S. courts have 
addressed the relevance of the Nuremberg Code to ATS cases relating to 
human subject research.235 In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., the court 
stated, "the Nuremberg Code . . . was the result of legal thought and legal 
principles, as opposed to medical or scientific principles, and thus should be 
the preferred standard for assessing the legality of scientific research on 
human subjects."236 However, the Nuremberg Code's universal restriction on 
child research may make it an unviable candidate for establishing a cause of 
action given countervailing U.S. policies, such as National Institutes of 
Health guidelines that require inclusion of children in all human subjects 
research, unless exclusion can be justified.237 After all, data from adult trials 
is often unhelpful in developing treatments for childhood diseases, in which 
pathophysiology and toxicities may be different. For human subjects research 
involving children, Congress or the Courts could opt to create a right of 
                                                        
233 Id. 
234 Yevgnia Shtilman, Pharmaceutical Drug Testing in the Former Soviet Union: 
Contract Research Organizations as Broker-Dealers in an Emerging Testing Ground 
for America's Big Pharma, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 425, 454 (2009). 
235 Wollensack, supra note 85, at 770. 
236 Id. 
237 The United National International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 
7, THE HUMAN RIGHTS WEB PAGE, available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html. 
The Nuremberg Code excludes children from human subjects research in its first 
article, stating: "The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. 
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent . . . ." 
NIH Policy and Guidelines on the Inclusion of Children as Participants in Research 
Involving Human Subjects, Mar. 6, 1998, available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/ 
guide/notice-files/not98-024.html. 
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action using the ATS, either through the Declaration of Helsinki or the 
ICCPR. 
Once either Congress or the courts recognize a right of action under the 
ATS, Congress could then set up a voluntary plaintiffs' forum. Some contend 
that this forum should be set up in the United States,238 while others argue for 
a forum in "any country where a pharmaceutical company conducts its 
clinical research" in order to avoid unnecessary hardship of plaintiffs needing 
to travel to the United States.239 Establishing a forum in another country, 
however, could result in unintended negative consequences, such as 
dramatically increasing the number of lawsuits against American companies, 
resulting in increased litigation costs, and likely leading to higher numbers of 
confidential settlements. This option would do little to increase transparency, 
and could result in delays in the development of life saving drugs as well as 
increased costs for such drugs. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Clinical studies in the developing world are commonly marred by 
1) deficiencies in the informed consent process; 2) flaws in research design 
and/or execution; and 3) allegations of fraud.240 As both the Guatemala and 
Nigeria Studies demonstrate, international human subjects, particularly those 
in developing nations, are vulnerable to harms emanating from these 
deficiencies, and currently do not have an adequate avenue for redress. ATS 
litigation represents a beacon of hope for harmed foreign research subjects, 
who, thanks to the January 2009 Abdullahi v. Pfizer decision and the U.S. 
Supreme Court's subsequent rejection of Pfizer's petition for a writ of 
certiorari, have the option of bringing cases in U.S. courts. The recent Garcia 
v. Sebelius class action has breathed new life into the viability of an ATS 
complaint based on breaches of international law norms, this time against a 
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239 Shtilman, supra note 234, at 453. 
240  Kohar Jones, Editorial, A Flawed Approach to Drug Testing, WASH. POST, 
May 18, 2006, at A22, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
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state actor. Furthermore, a recent FDA final rule will provide human subjects 
with additional protections by strengthening the IEC and informed consent 
regimes and establishing a vehicle for onsite inspections. A new cause of 
action under the ATS, and a more robust regulatory regime that ensures 
informed consent, proper study design and execution, and FDA oversight 
appears to be on the horizon. 
